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The Economic Psychology of Incentives: An International 
Study of Top Managers 
 
ABSTRACT   
The world-wide inflation in executive compensation in recent years has been accompanied by 
an increase in the prevalence of long-term incentives.  This article demonstrates how the 
subjectively perceived value of long-term incentives is affected by risk aversion, uncertainty 
aversion, and time preferences.  Based on a unique empirical study which involved collecting 
primary data on executive preferences from around the world, and using a theoretical 
framework which draws on behavioral agency theory, we conclude that, while long-term 
incentives are perceived by executives to be effective, they are not in fact an efficient form of 
reward. This outcome is not significantly affected by cross-cultural differences.  We 
conjecture that boards of directors, acting on behalf of shareholders, increase the size of long-
term incentive awards in order to compensate executives for the perceived loss of value when 
compared with less risky, more certain and more immediate forms of reward.   
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Agency Theory, Behavioral Economics, Executive Compensation, Motivation, 
Long-term Incentives 
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The Economic Psychology of Incentives: An International 
Study of Top Managers 
 
1. Introduction 
In parallel with the widely reported inflation in executive pay around the world during the 
last twenty years (Boyd, Santos, & Shen, 2012), long-term incentives have come to represent 
an increasingly large proportion of total compensation. Although long-term incentives take 
many forms, they typically comprise a deferred award of company stock whose vesting is 
contingent upon the satisfaction of a time condition (for example, that the holder is still 
employed by the company on the third anniversary of the date of award) and sometimes also 
on a financial performance condition (for example, that the total shareholder return of the 
employing company outperforms that of comparator companies) (Milkovich, Newman, & 
Gerhart, 2011; Pepper, 2006).  For the purposes of this paper, we define long-term incentives 
broadly, to include share-based incentives such as stock options, restricted stock and 
performance shares, as well as equity-linked cash-based incentives such as phantom options, 
and stock appreciation rights.   
In the United States, long-term incentives comprised 47.8% of the total earnings of top 
executives in Fortune 500 companies in 2010, up from 44.7% in 2006; in the United 
Kingdom the corresponding percentages in FTSE350 companies were 49.6% in 2010 and 
39.7% in 20061. In recent years there has been a new emphasis on long-term incentives in 
Germany (Heimes & Seemann, 2011), France and other parts of Western Europe, and they 
have also become increasingly common among large companies in both China (Conyon & 
He, 2012) and India (Chakrabarti, Subramanian, Yadav, & Yadav, 2012).  Among the major 
developed nations, only Japan continues to play down the importance of long-term incentives 
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(Sakawa, Moriyama, & Watanabel, 2012).   Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005) maintain that the 
increased acceptability and use of equity-based compensation is a significant cause of the 
overall rise in executive pay.  Similarly, Gayle and Miller (2009) argue that much of the 
recent growth in managerial compensation is attributable to increases in option grants and 
stock awards. 
Long-term incentives also represent an important application of agency theory, which 
postulates that incentive contracts are a key moderator of agent performance.  According to 
standard agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), the relationship between pay and 
performance is essentially a linear one: the greater the proportion of executive pay which is 
delivered in the form of incentives, the better the alignment of interests between shareholders 
and their agents, and the better (other things being equal) executive performance.  Given the 
apparent force of the academic underpinning, it is no coincidence that in western capitalist 
economies long-term incentives have come to comprise such a significant proportion of 
executive pay.  However, it has been apparent for some time that agency theory has 
shortcomings. In the 1990s, empirical work carried out by Jensen and Murphy (1990) failed 
to establish a conclusive link between CEO pay and stock price performance.  Ten years 
later, in a meta-analysis of 137 empirical studies, Tosi, Werner, Katz and Gomez-Meija 
(2000) similarly found that incentive alignment as an explanatory agency construct for CEO 
pay was at best weakly supported by the evidence. More recently, Frydman and Jenter (2010) 
have argued, based on a review of U.S. executive compensation data covering the period 
1936 to 2005, that neither optimal contracting (agency theory) nor the managerial power 
hypothesis is fully consistent with the available evidence.  John Roberts, another agency 
theorist, has commented that agency theory performed poorly during the 2008-9 financial 
crisis, arguing that strong incentives may have exacerbated some of the behaviors which 
contributed to the crisis  (Roberts, 2010).  We conclude, like others  (e.g., Cuevas-Rodriquez, 
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Gomez-Mejia, & Wiseman, 2012) that the time is now ripe for new empirical research and 
for a re-theorizing of the principal-agent model as it applies to executive compensation. 
This paper reports the findings of an international empirical study of long-term 
incentives, drawing on concepts and methods from the behavioral economics literature, 
especially behavioral-agency theory (Pepper & Gore, 2012; Rebitzer & Taylor, 2011; 
Sanders & Carpenter, 2003; Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998).  It builds on an earlier study 
by (Pepper, Gore, & Crossman, 2013), and employs a new, much larger, international data 
set.  We pose the question:  “Are long-term incentives perceived by executives to be 
effective, and are they in fact an efficient way of compensating agents?”  We define 
effectiveness and efficiency in the following terms.  A plan, program or policy is considered 
to be “effective” if it achieves its intended objectives, which in the case of long-term 
incentives are to motivate executives and to align their interests with those of shareholders. A 
plan, program or policy is “efficient” if it causes inputs to be minimized for a given level of 
outputs, or outputs to be maximized for a given level of inputs. We place particular emphasis 
on agent motivation, following Leibenstein (1966) in arguing that, where labor is an input, a 
choice or allocation is not efficient if the available amount of labor is not fully motivated to 
provide maximum effort and give high performance.   
By adopting effectiveness as well as efficiency as criteria of assessment, we follow a 
long line of management theorists dating back to Barnard (1938 |1968) 2.  Simon (1945 |1997) 
pointed out that the terms “effectiveness” and “efficiency” were considered to be almost 
synonymous until the end of the 19th century and were generally thought to mean the power 
to accomplish the purpose intended.  The meanings of the two words subsequently diverged 
and efficiency, defined in terms of the relationship between inputs and outputs, came to be 
used, first in engineering and subsequently in economics, as the main criterion of assessment.  
We argue that there is a logical connection between effectiveness (F) and efficiency (E).  
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While something can be “effective and efficient” (i.e., F ∧ E, such that {p: p ∈F and ∈E}) or 
“neither effective nor efficient”  (~ F ∧ ~E; {p: p ∉F and ∉E}), we argue that it is not 
meaningful to say that something is “efficient but not effective” (~F ∧ E; i.e.,{p: p ∈ Ø}): 
formally ∀x(Ex → Fx, i.e., a lower cost, or no cost at all, could always be incurred while still 
failing to achieve the desired objectives; the concept of effectiveness is already implied by 
the concept of efficiency).  It is, however, entirely possible for something to be “effective but 
not efficient” (F ∧ ~E; {p: p ∈F and ∉E}), a logical possibility the importance of which will 
be apparent in the latter part of this paper. 
In this article, we advance the proposition that the widespread use of long-term 
incentives may have contributed to inflation in executive pay.  Although based on a 
fundamentally different logic, this is consistent with previous research by Lambert, Larcker 
and Verrechia (1991), Meulbroek (2001), Hall and Murphy (2002) and Buck, Bruce, Main 
and Udueni (2003), on which we comment further in the theory and discussion sections.  The 
paper proceeds as follows.  It begins by setting out a theoretical framework based on 
behavioral-agency theory, from which three research propositions are derived.  We explain 
our research methodology, before reporting the results generally, and then by country, under 
the headings of risk and uncertainty aversion, time discounting and the perceived 
effectiveness of long-term incentives. We correlate our results with Hofstede’s cross-cultural 
measurement framework (Hofstede, 1981 | 2001).  We also examine the data by reference to 
sex, age and industry sector.  A discussion section follows, in which the results are analyzed 
by reference to the three research propositions, before the article concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical framework 
Behavioral-agency theory (Pepper & Gore, 2012) places the relationship between executive 
compensation, agent performance and firm performance at the center of the agency 
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relationship.  It assumes bounded rationality (Simon, 1987 |1997), which Foss (2010) has 
described in terms of: (1) limitations in the human capacity to process information; (2) 
attempts to economize on mental effort by relying on short-cuts or heuristics; and (3) a 
consequence of the fact that cognition and judgement are subject to a wide range of biases 
and errors.  Behavioral-agency theory models the performance of an agent (ā) as a manager of 
a large firm in terms of his or her ability (A), motivation (M) and work opportunity (O). This 
is sometimes known as the “AMO” model after Appelbaum, Bailey, Berg & Kalleberg 
(2000)  and Boxall & Purcell (2003).  Agents will perform if they have the ability (the 
necessary knowledge, skills and aptitude), the motivation, and the right opportunities 
(including the necessary work structures and business environment).   The mechanism which 
links the job performance of an individual agent with the performance of the firm is 
explained by incorporating upper-echelons theory (Carpenter, Geletkanycz, & Sanders, 2004; 
Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009; Hambrick & Mason, 1984).  This postulates a 
causal connection between business performance (the dependent variable), the cognitive 
skills of top managers, their observable personal characteristics (e.g., age, education, 
experience, socio-economic background etc.), their strategic choices, and the objective 
situation (independent variables). Behavioral-agency theory simplifies the upper-echelons 
approach in the interests of theoretical parsimony by taking the financial performance of a 
firm to be a function of the performance of the first agent (Pā), the performance of other 
agents in the firm’s top management team (Pn), and the external business environment (B). A 
tacit assumption is that a firm’s business strategy is devised and implemented by the top 
management team.  “Top managers” (and hence the “top management team”) are defined as 
the most senior executives of a company who are responsible for defining and executing a 
firm’s strategy and who, through their actions, are capable of affecting the company’s profits, 
share price, reputation and market positioning (Carpenter et al., 2004; Pepper, 2006). 
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Behavioral-agency theory places much greater emphasis on agent motivation than the 
standard agency model, which focuses primarily on the alignment of the interests of 
principals and agents (Eisenhardt, 1989).  The underlying assumptions in the standard agency 
model are that organizations are profit-seeking, agents are rent-seeking and there is no non-
pecuniary agent motivation (Besley & Ghatak, 2005).  It is also assumed that an agent’s 
utility is positively contingent on pecuniary incentives and negatively contingent on effort, 
that motivation and effort both increase monotonically with additional rewards, and that the 
pay-effort function is a straight line with a positive gradient proceeding from bottom left to 
top right.  Effort is considered to be a key identifier of motivated behavior (Ebert, 2010), so 
“effort” and “motivation” are frequently used interchangeably, although strictly speaking the 
former (effort) is a visible manifestation of the latter, a mental state (being motivated).  
The theory of work motivation most commonly used by psychologists in investigations 
into the motivational impact of pay and monetary incentives is expectancy theory (Vroom, 
1964).  According to expectancy theory, motivational force is a function of valence, 
instrumentality and expectancy.  Vroom expressed his central theory in two linked 
propositions: first, an outcome (j) acquires valence (Vj) because of its perceived instrumental 
connection (Ijk) to another valent outcome (Vk ); secondly, the motivational force (Mi) on a 
person to act is equal to the product of the expectancy (Eij) that an action (i) will be followed 
by a particular outcome (j), and by the valence of that outcome (Vj).  Expectancy (a measure 
of expected probability) takes values between 0 and +1, while valence (a measure of 
subjectively perceived value) takes values from +1 (positively desired) to -1(positively not 
desired). 
In this article, we adopt a variation of expectancy theory first proposed by Steel and 
König (2006) as part of an integrative theory of motivation which they call “temporal 
motivation theory”. Steel and König argue that extrinsic motivation can best be understood in 
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terms of expectancy and valence, weakened by delay, influenced by risk and uncertainty, 
with different valences for perceived gains and losses. Expectancy and valence are both 
calculated in accordance with prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1992).  Time effects are determined by a hyperbolic discount function after 
Ainslie (1991), rather than the more conventional exponential discounting function used in 
finance and discounted utility theory.  Hyperbolic discounting has been extensively tested in 
experiments and in field research (Frederick, Loewenstein, & O'Donoghue, 2002) and is the 
dominant theory of inter-temporal choice favored by behavioral economists (see Graves & 
Ringuest, 2012).  Stated formally: 
                
where Mi is the motivational force to perform act i, Eikpt  is the expectancy that act i will lead, 
via j, to outcome k, Vkpt  is the valence for outcome k, δ is the personal discount factor for the 
delay between act i and outcome k, and t represents the time-lag. Economists will recognize 
this equation as an expected utility function.  Vroom’s contribution in the 1960s was to turn 
an economic theory of rational choice (expected utility theory) into a psychological theory of 
motivation (expectancy theory) (Pepper & Gore, 2012). 
A number of scholars, working deductively in a rational choice framework, have argued 
that the cost of equity incentives will often significantly exceed the value of those incentives 
as calculated by risk-averse, undiversified executives who are unable to sell stock or hedge 
their risk (Buck et al., 2003; Hall & Murphy, 2002; Lambert et al., 1991; Meulbroek, 2001) .  
We also argue that the subjectively perceived value of long-term incentives is systematically 
underestimated by senior executives, but for reasons of economic psychology (drawing on 
behavioral-agency theory) rather than rational choice.  An important implication of Equation 
(1) is that subjectively perceived value, or “valence”, as we call it after Vroom (1964), will be 
affected by risk aversion, uncertainty aversion, and time discounting.  Accordingly, we use 
Mi  = 
Eikpt x Vkpt  (1) 
1+ δt 
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the behavioral-agency framework to generate a number of research propositions about 
executive compensation.  The first two propositions, which both relate to the efficiency of 
long-term incentives, are as follows: 
Proposition 1: The valence of long-term incentives is systematically under-estimated 
by senior executives because of the way that risk is subjectively assessed (i.e., risk 
aversion) and as a result of the cognitive response to uncertainty (i.e., uncertainty 
aversion). 
Proposition 2: The valence of long-term incentives is systematically under-estimated 
by senior executives because of the way that time preferences are discounted.     
Previous empirical work on long-term incentives has tended to focus on single-country 
or sometimes dual-country data sets.  One criticism of executive compensation research in 
general is that there has been a relative absence of many genuinely international studies 
(Boyd et al., 2012).  This is possibly because of problems in obtaining comparable multi-
country datasets.  The current research is, however, truly international, involving participants 
from more than 17 countries.  The impact of cultural differences on risk, uncertainty and time 
preferences is an important part of the analysis.  Empirical investigations into prospect theory 
and time discounting, both of which are embedded in the behavioral-agency model via 
Equation (1), appear to indicate that, while there are measurable differences between 
countries, cultural differences do not cause risk, uncertainty and time preferences to depart 
from the general precepts of prospect theory and hyperbolic discounting. In other words, the 
behavior of people in most countries tends to be in accordance the general predictions of 
prospect theory and hyperbolic discounting (Rieger, Wang, & Hens, 2011; Wang, Rieger, & 
Hens, 2010).  There are, nevertheless, measurable differences between national cultures.  In 
anthropological terms, the behavioral-agency theory account is therefore etic not emic. 
Accordingly, we frame the third research proposition as a null hypothesis: 
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Proposition 3: Notwithstanding measurable differences between national cultures, the 
outcomes of propositions 1 and 2 are not significantly affected by cross-cultural 
variations. 
To summarize: we argue that, when long-term incentives are examined in the context of 
a new set of assumptions about agent behavior derived from behavioral-agency theory, a 
number of important questions are raised about how long-term incentives are subjectively 
valued by senior executives, the extent to which this is affected by the national culture of the 
agent, and the implications for executive behavior.  These lead us to question whether long-
term incentives are in practice an effective and efficient way of compensating executive 
agents. 
 
3. Methods 
3.1. Data collection 
Primary empirical data on the preferences and attitudes of managerial elites are notoriously 
hard to gather (Pettigrew, 1992).  Accordingly, the authors entered into an arrangement with 
an international research firm, part of an international business news and financial 
information group. The research firm gathered data from its global panel of independent 
senior executives, using a questionnaire designed by the authors. The data were collected 
during October and November 2011.  The panel is built around the subscriber network of an 
international business magazine and website (Forbes magazine and Forbes.com). The sample 
was selected from the panel by identifying potential survey respondents based on a list of pre-
selection criteria (earnings, job title, company size etc.) to ensure as far as possible that only 
“top managers” as defined for the purposes of the study were included within the sample.  A 
panel-screener questionnaire was used to ensure that only panelists who met the pre-selection 
criteria were targeted.  Participants were subsequently re-qualified according to the pre-
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selection criteria by including further screening questions within the survey instrument itself.  
Invitations were issued to 12860 executives by email, and 756 people agreed to participate, a 
response rate of around 6%.  While this was disappointing, low response rates are a common 
problem when surveying senior executives , particularly on a sensitive topic like executive 
pay (Cycyota & Harrison, 2006; Pepper et al., 2013).  Cross-national industrial surveys are 
also prone to low response rates (Harzing, 2000).  These factors have a tendency to 
compound.  As a result, while response rates of 30-35% can be expected in single country 
surveys of top managers (e.g., Collins & Clark, 2003), response rates in international studies 
are often  significantly lower (e.g., Geletkanycz & Black, 2001; Schlegelmilch & Robertson, 
1995).  A consequence is that non-response bias is a risk in the present case.  Cascio (2012 
p.2541) describes this as occurring: “in a statistical survey if those who respond to the survey 
differ in important respects from those who do not respond (e.g., employee or asset size and 
industry representation of organizations; respondents from HR vs. those from finance, 
accounting, or sales).  While we note this point below in the limitations section, we have 
addressed the issue in part by a careful examination of the sample demographics, which 
showed that a wide range of ages, senior roles, company types, company sizes, industries and 
countries were represented in the sample.  A chi-squared (χ2) test for goodness of fit was used 
to test the sample against the panel demographics.  The results demonstrated that there was 
no significant difference between the demographic profile of the sample and the panel data: 
χ
2 (df = 62, N =756) = 2.57, p < 0.005, indicating, with a high degree of probability, that the 
sample was representative of the panel.  χ2 tests at individual factor level (i.e., age, gender, 
job title etc.,) were also calculated and the results were consistent with this conclusion. The 
main demographics are summarized in Table 1.  Of the 756 participants, 365 had long-term 
incentives, representing 48.3% of the total sample. This is in line with the industry averages 
for the U.S. and U.K., as described in the introduction. 
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TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
The results were analyzed in aggregate, comparing participants with and without long-
term incentives, and by segmenting the data into 17 country groups.  Participants were 
categorized into three earnings bands: $350,000 and under (n = 506); $350,000 - $724,999 (n 
= 178); $725,000 or more (n = 72).  Further segmentation was carried out by gender, age and, 
given the significance of incentives in banking, insurance and asset management, by 
comparing the results for participants employed in the financial-services industry with those 
of participants employed in other industry sectors.   
 
3.2. Questionnaire 
The questionnaire contained 18 questions on the behavioral aspects of senior executive 
reward systems, of which 11 questions related to risk, uncertainty, time discounting and the 
effectiveness of long-term incentives. Other parts of the questionnaire were designed to 
investigate intrinsic motivation and inequity aversion and will be the subject of a separate 
paper. The survey instrument was translated from English by a professional translation 
service into Chinese, Spanish, Portuguese, German, French, Russian and Polish.  All 
monetary amounts were stated in U.S. dollars.  Separate questionnaires were issued to 
participants in the three earnings brackets.  In the lowest earnings bracket ($350,000 and 
under) the questionnaire began with a question on risk which invited participants to choose 
between a gamble (50% chance of winning $5,250; otherwise nothing), a fixed amount 
($2,250 for certain), or to indicate that they were indifferent between the two options.   The 
second question reframed this as a choice between a bonus of $90,000 (with a 50% chance of 
receipt) or a fixed payment of $41,250.  In both cases, the fact that a fixed probability was 
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provided meant that participants could calculate the expected values and risk premiums of the 
gambles.  In the first case, the expected value of the gamble is $2,625, representing a risk 
premium on the certain option of 16.7%.  In the second case the expected value of the gamble 
is $45,000, representing a risk premium of 9.1%.  To put this in context, rational choice risk 
premiums are estimated by Conyon, Core and Guay (2011) at between 5.8% (for an executive 
with a relative risk aversion factor of 2 and 50%  of his or her wealth tied-up in firm equity) 
and 11.0% (risk aversion factor 3, 67% of wealth in firm equity).  The risk premiums implied 
by the questions in the present questionnaire were therefore above, or at the upper end of, this 
range 
The three questions on uncertainty invited participants to choose between more certain 
and less certain outcomes where the expected value of one of the options could not be 
accurately calculated. For example, one of the questions was framed as follows: 
Given that the annual bonus of a senior executive a large company is around 
$45,000 and the median long-term incentive award is around $67,500 per year 
per year, which of the following choices would you prefer? (A) A guaranteed 
bonus of $45,000 payable in three years’ time. (B) A guaranteed bonus of 
10,000 shares deliverable in three years’ time. The current share price is 
$4.50.  In the last 12 months the share price has fluctuated between $2.25 and 
$6.75. (C) Indifferent between A and B. 
Assuming a risk free rate of, say, 1% (on the basis that when the questionnaire was issued in 
2011 U.S. Treasury yields for were 0.05% for 3 month bonds, 0.75% for 3 year bonds and 
2.78% for 10 year bonds), stock volatility of 50%, no dividends, and a nominal strike price 
(as this is restricted stock) the Black-Scholes value of the share award in choice (B) was 
calculated to be $4.50.  This is also the value which participants were expected intuitively to 
calculate based on the limited data available in the question.   
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Three questions were designed to investigate the rate at which participants discounted 
future receipts.  For example, one of these questions asked: 
Given that the median long-term incentive award of a senior executive of a large 
company is around $67,500 per year, which of the following choices would you prefer? 
(A) A chance of receiving $37,500 tomorrow with a probability of 75%; otherwise 
nothing. (B) A chance of receiving $90,000 in three years’ time with a probability of 
75%; otherwise nothing. (C) Indifferent between A and B. 
The discount rate implied in this question (the rate at which $90,000 must be discounted in 
order to equate to a net present value of $37,500) is 34%. The question was then repeated, 
except that the amount in (A) was increased to $56,250, representing a discount rate of 17%.  
These two discount rates were chosen to provide separate triangulation points from which 
median discount rates could be estimated. The 75% probability factor was inserted into both 
options in order to ensure that participants did not reframe the choice as a certain sum 
received (more or less) immediately with a risky sum received in future.  Thus the question 
was designed as far as possible to ensure that participants were assessing temporal factors, 
not risk. 
Three questions examined the motivational impact, perceived value and perceived 
effectiveness of long-term incentives by asking survey participants to comment on three pairs 
of statements (e.g., “I am strongly motivated by the opportunity to participate in my firm’s 
long-term incentive plan” vs. “I am not particularly motivated by the opportunity to 
participate in my firm’s long-term incentive plan”), with answers being recorded on a five- 
point Likert scale. 
Questions of identical form to the above were used for participants in the two higher 
earnings brackets ($350,000-$725,000 and $725,000 or more) but the amounts at stake in 
each question were benchmarked at a higher level, appropriate for the relevant earnings band.   
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For example, the bonus gamble in the second question ($90,000 vs. a fixed payment of 
$41,250) compares with an amount of $320,000 vs. a fixed payment of $145,000 in the 
middle earnings bracket and $555,000 vs. $247,500 for certain in the highest earnings 
bracket. 
 
3.3. Data analysis 
The data were analyzed using IBM SPSS Statistics version 19.  Reliability (internal 
consistency) was assessed at an individual level of analysis by calculating Cronbach’s α in 
the case of questions arranged in triplets, and inter-item correlations for questions arranged in 
pairs where Cronbach’s α is not normally appropriate (Pallant, 2007).  As well as providing 
descriptive statistics, indices for risk aversion and uncertainty were calculated at a country 
level of analysis by dividing the difference between the total number of participants choosing 
options A and B by the sum of the total number of responses to A plus B.  Participants who 
were indifferent to the outcome and selected option C were ignored. The range of possible 
results varied between +1 (less risk averse, more tolerant of uncertainty) to -1 (more risk 
averse, less tolerant of uncertainty).  A similar approach was taken in calculating an index of 
the perceived effectiveness of long-term incentives by taking 1 and 2 in the Likert scale as 
positive (i.e., index = +1), 4 and 5 as negative (i.e., index = -1), and 3 as the midpoint (i.e., 
index = 0).  A temporal discount factor was calculated using the results of question 2 on time 
(in which a discount rate of 34% is implied), question 3 (implied discount rate 17%) and 
adopting linear algebra to estimate the median rate. 
In order to assess reliability (external equivalence), country results were correlated with 
Hofstede’s cross-cultural measurement framework.  Risk aversion, uncertainty aversion and 
time discounting were tested for correlations with Hofstede’s four original cultural 
dimensions, plus long-term versus short-term orientation, using Hofstede’s most recent data 
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matrix.  Two of the cultural dimensions identified by Hofstede (1981 | 2001) and Hofstede 
and Bond (1988) were predicted to be particularly relevant.  First, individualism-collectivism 
(IDV): Weber and Hsee (1998) argue that collectivism acts as mutual insurance against 
losses, such that members of a collectivist culture, like China, perceive the risk of risky 
options to be smaller than members of an individualistic culture, like the United States.  
Therefore, according to Weber and Hsee, the rank-order of country individualism should 
predict rank-order differences in risk aversion.  Secondly, long-term versus short-term 
orientation (LTO), the fifth dimension of national cultures identified by Hofstede and Bond 
(1988), was, for self-evident reasons, predicted to be associated with the rank-order of 
temporal discounts (Wang et al., 2010).   
A third cultural dimension identified by Hofstede, uncertainty avoidance (UAI), might 
also have been expected to be relevant to the current enquiry. However, the term “uncertainty 
aversion” is used in this paper in the sense defined by Knight (1921 | 2006)  i.e.,  
indeterminable probability.  This is not the same as UAI, which Hofstede defines in terms of 
employment stability, rule orientation and aversion to stress (Hofstede, 1981 | 2001).  The 
two items are not, therefore, correlates.  Bontempo, Bottom and Weber (1997) have, 
alternatively, associated uncertainty avoidance with risk aversion, but Hofstede explicitly 
states that uncertainty avoidance is not the same as risk avoidance (Hofstede, 1981 | 2001: 
148).  For these reasons, correlations between UAI and the measures employed in the study 
were not assumed.   
The results of the study are reported below, first in aggregate, then by country, and 
finally for the major variables (risk aversion, uncertainty aversion, time discounting and 
perceived LTI effectiveness). We also comment on the differences arising by reference to 
sex, age and industry sector in which the survey participants were employed.  A discussion 
section follows. 
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4. Results 
The aggregate results of the study are set out in Table 2.  For convenience, the findings are 
reported by reference to the amounts set out in the questionnaire which covered the lowest 
earnings bracket.  The results shows a distinct skew towards smaller, less risky options, 
indicating risk aversion (the average risk index for all participants was -.24), smaller more 
certain choices (average uncertainty index of -.10), and more immediate outcomes, evidenced 
by very high average temporal discount rates (the average estimated time discount rate for all 
participants was 33%).  There was no significant difference in risk and time preferences 
between participants who had long-term incentives and those who did not which, given the 
focus of the study on incentives, contributes to the validity of the results.  Participants with 
long-term incentives had less pronounced uncertainty index scores (-.04) than all participants 
(-.10), but the index was still negative.  Notwithstanding these results, long-term incentives 
were generally perceived to be quite effective, with an average effectiveness index for all 
participants of .14.    
 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Comparative results by country are set out in Table 3 and examined in more detail below.  
Skewness (scores of < 1.0), kurtosis (scores of < 1.2) and the results of a Shapiro-Wilk test 
(p >.05) were all indicative of approximate normality (Hatcher, 2013).  The distribution of 
the risk index was positively skewed (i.e., the mass of the distribution was concentrated on 
the left of the median) with a median score of -.24 and a 95% probability upper bound of       
-.11.  In a similar way, distribution of the uncertainty index was positively skewed around a 
median of -.09 with an upper bound of -.05.  Taken together, these results are consistent with 
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the first research proposition: senior executives systematically under-estimate the valence of 
long-term incentives as a result of their aversion to risk and uncertainty. 
The time discount score was positively skewed around a median of 31.0%, with a 95% 
lower bound of 24.6%, indicative of time discount rates significantly in excess of both 
inflation and standard financial discount rates.  This is consistent with the second research 
proposition that senior executives systematically underestimate the valence of long-term 
incentives because of the way that time preferences are discounted.  In contrast, the LTI 
effectiveness index was negatively skewed (i.e., the mass of the distribution was concentrated 
on the right of the median) with a median score of .13 and a 95% probability lower bound 
of .09, indicating that for most participants long-term incentives were perceived to be quite 
effective. 
While it is evident that there are indeed measurable differences between countries, what 
is also apparent is that cultural differences do not appear to cause risk, uncertainty and time 
preferences to depart from the general precepts of prospect theory and hyperbolic 
discounting, supporting the general argument of Rieger et al (2011) and Wang et al (2010). 
 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
4.1. Risk and uncertainty aversion 
On average participants preferred smaller, less risky outcomes to larger, more risky ones. 
This tendency becomes more marked in response to the second question when the amount 
involved (described as a bonus) was larger.  The overall results (risk index for all participants 
= -.24, country mean = -.23, standard deviation = .23) were consistent with prospect theory 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992), and support Proposition 1.  
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Outliers included France (risk index = .01), China (.08) and Mexico (.32), suggesting a 
greater than average appetite for risk among senior executives in these countries.  The results 
for participants with Chinese cultural roots were consistent with Weber and Hsee (1998) and 
Hsee and Weber (1999), who found that the Chinese were significantly less risk averse than 
members of Anglo-Saxon cultures.  Hsee and Weber attribute this to “cushioning” – the 
expectation of family and community support in the event that a loss is realized after 
selecting a risky option.  Other collectivist cultures in Central and South America also show a 
significant degree of risk tolerance, consistent with our results for Mexico. 
Attitudes towards uncertainty (i.e., indeterminable expected values) were similar to, 
though less pronounced than, attitudes towards risk.  The overall result for participants 
indicated a degree of aversion to uncertainty (uncertainty index for all participants = -.10, 
country mean = -.08, standard deviation = .07) with a range from .08 (Argentina) to -.19 
(Netherlands and the United Kingdom).  This is also consistent with Proposition 1. The 
Chinese aversion to uncertainty (unknown probabilities) contrasts with their comparative 
tolerance of risk (known probabilities). 
 
4.2. Time discounting 
According to standard financial theory, individuals should discount future receipts at 
rates which are consistent with the return on comparably risky future cash flows, adjusted for 
inflation.  In the present case, time discount rates should, therefore, have been close to the 
risk-free rate of around 1% per annum, subject to local inflation, which in 2011 varied 
between under 1% (Switzerland) to over 9% (Argentina) (see Table 3, column 3).  Evidence 
from our study indicates that executives discount at much higher rates (median time discount 
rate for all participants = 33%, country mean = 33%, standard deviation = 15%).  There was 
no significant correlation between time discounts and country inflation rates (r = .096, n = 
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17).  This was no great surprise given our thesis that subjective time discount rates owe more 
to psychological factors than to rational choice responses to inflation.  Participants in all 
countries discounted highly, with estimated median time discount rates varying from 14.6% 
in Germany to 69.7% in Mexico.  These results support Proposition 2. 
 
4.3. Perceived effectiveness of long-term incentives 
The LTI effectiveness index was constructed from responses to three questions which 
asked participants how motivational, valuable and effective they perceived long-term 
incentives to be.  The results were generally positive (LTI effectiveness index for all 
participants = .14 country mean = .13, standard deviation = .09) and, with the exception of 
Poland, country indices ranging from .04 (Russia and Mexico) to .28 (Australia).  Poland was 
the only outlier, with an effectiveness index of only -.06.  Poland aside, the results indicate 
that long-term incentives are generally perceived by plan participants to be effective, 
notwithstanding survey participants’ attitudes to risk and uncertainty, and the high temporal 
discount rates applied to future receipts.   
 
4.4. Hofstede correlations 
The results of the correlation testing with Hofstede’s five cultural dimensions are set out 
in Table 4.  As predicted, there was a very significant correlation (-.642, p < .01, n = 17) at a 
country level of analysis between risk aversion and Hofstede’s IDV dimension, as well as a 
significant correlation (-.596, p < .05, n = 17) at a country level of analysis between time 
discounting and Hofstede’s LTO dimension.  These data provide external support for the 
reliability of the risk aversion indices and time discounts.  In Hofstede’s framework, higher 
scores indicate greater individualism and a longer-term orientation, whereas in our 
framework a score of less than zero indicates greater risk aversion, and higher time discount 
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rates implying a shorter time horizon, hence in both cases the correlations are negative. The 
absence of any correlation between UAI and either the risk or uncertainty indices was also as 
predicted, given the difference between Knight’s construction, which we have employed in 
this paper, and Hofstede’s construction of uncertainty (see section 3.3 above).  
 
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
4.5. Sex, age and industry sector  
Although in some ways incidental to the main study, the data were also analyzed by 
gender (male vs. female), by age (in six age brackets: below under years, 40-44 years, 45-49 
years, 50-54 years, 55-59 years, 60-64 years, and 65 years and over), and by industry sector 
in which survey participants were employed.  Some interesting patterns were observed.  
There were noticeable differences between the sexes when it came to risk.  Female executives 
(n = 137, risk index -.30) were significantly more risk averse than male executives (n = 619, 
risk index = -.23.  This is consistent with the conclusions of Croson and Gneezy (2009) who 
reviewed the experimental economics literature and found strong support for the proposition 
that women are more risk averse than men (although they also note that observed differences 
in risk preferences are attenuated in the case of female managers, especially those who have 
professional investment expertise).  An earlier review of the psychology literature on gender 
differences in risk-taking (Byrnes, Miller, & Schafer, 1999) reached a similar conclusion that 
women are generally more risk averse than men.  There were also significant differences 
when it came to time preferences: women (time discount rate = 39%) discounted future 
receipts at a higher rate than men (time discount rate = 32%).  When it came to uncertainty, 
there were only marginal differences between men (uncertainty index = -.11) and women 
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(uncertainty index = -.10).  However, men (effectiveness index = .14) thought long-term 
incentives were more effective than women (effectiveness index =.11).   
Secondly, executives aged between 55 and 59 (n = 80, risk index = -.38) were noticeably 
more risk averse than both younger and older executives.  Indeed, but for the peak between 
55 and 59, risk aversion gradually declined from -.28 under age 40 to -.12 at 65 years and 
over.  The profile for uncertainty aversion fluctuated around -.11 (plus or minus .05) between 
the ages of under 40 and 64, before suddenly dropping below zero for executives of 65 years 
and over.  Time discount rates started at 38% (for ages 40 and under) and remained relatively 
high, before eventually declining to 28% for those aged 65 years and over.  
The pattern which emerged was that young executives were, relatively speaking, less risk 
averse but higher time-discounters than older executives.  Executives in the middle age 
bracket appeared to be relatively conservative in their risk, uncertainty and time preferences. 
Older executives (aged 65 and over) were less averse to risk and uncertainty than younger 
executives, as well as being lower time-discounters.  On the other hand, the perceived 
effectiveness of long-term incentives increased with age (under 40 years = .10; 60-64 years 
= .19) before falling away sharply for those aged 65 and over, presumably because at that age 
career expectations are generally shorter than the three year term of a typical long-term 
incentive plan.   
Thirdly, executives working in the financial-services industry (n = 107, risk index = -.36) 
were more risk averse than those working in other industries, with the exception only of retail 
(n = 60, risk index = -.38).  Financial-services executives were also high time-discounters 
(36% discount rate), but had a lower than average aversion to uncertainty (uncertainty index 
= -.04).  Nicholson, Soane, Fenton-O’Creevy and Willman (2005) have found that people 
working in the finance sector are, in most domains of risk, relatively risk averse compared 
with people working in other industries (see also Fenton-O'Creevy, Nicholson, Soane, & 
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Willman, 2005).  The other noticeable outlier was industrial manufacturing (n = 54), where 
executives participating in the study had a very balanced perspective on risk (risk index 
= .00), uncertainty (uncertainty index = .02), and were lower than average time-discounters 
(discount rate = 28%).  Manufacturing executives were also the most positive about the 
effectiveness of long-term incentives (effectiveness index = .22).   
 
5. Discussion and conclusions 
The economic cost to a company of providing a long-term incentive is the amount that would 
be received were the company to sell an equivalent equity instrument to an outside investor 
rather than making an equity award to an executive (Hall & Murphy, 2002).  In this article, 
we have demonstrated that the value of long-term incentives, as subjectively perceived by 
senior executives, is less than the economic cost to the company.  We have already noted that 
this is not the first time that the efficiency of stock-based rewards has been questioned (Buck 
et al., 2003; Hall & Murphy, 2002; Lambert et al., 1991; Meulbroek, 2001).  Previous 
arguments have assumed risk averse, non-diversified, but fully rational executives and have 
largely been based on the portfolio effect: rational investors seeking to balance their 
investment portfolio will discount disproportionate holdings of a single stock, especially 
when that stock is closely linked to their employment.  We contend, in a way that is 
consistent with these earlier arguments but based on a fundamentally different logic, that 
senior executives underweight the value of their long-term incentives because of both risk 
and uncertainty aversion, as well as time-discounting effects, connected with their bounded 
rationality.  We provide empirical evidence that indicates that executives’ subjective 
perceptions of value in practice are, if anything, less than the values calculated deductively by 
rational choice theorists: put formally, we argue that: C > Vr ≥ Vb, where C is the economic 
cost of an long-term equity incentive, Vr is the value to an executive calculated on a rational 
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choice basis and Vb is the subjectively perceived value to the executive computed on a 
bounded rationality basis. 
The economic cost of a long-term incentive is also the amount which must be expensed 
in a company’s accounts.  Under the provisions of international generally accepted 
accounting principles (hereafter “international GAAP”), specifically U.S. FAS 123 (Revised) 
and IFRS2 (both entitled “Share-based payment”)  a company is required to measure the fair 
value of all equity instruments awarded in return for services received. They must charge this 
fair value against earnings over the period during which services are provided.  The service 
period is normally the same as the vesting period of the award, typically three years. Fair 
value is calculated at the date that the award is granted and is defined for the purposes of 
IFRS2 as “the amount for which an asset could be exchanged, a liability settled, or an equity 
instrument granted could be exchanged, between knowledgeable willing parties in an arm’s 
length transaction”.  In practice, share-based payments are often valued using the Black-
Scholes method.  Performance conditions relating to vesting, such as relative total 
shareholder return, are also taken into account in assessing fair value, with complex rules 
applying if estimates change.  The overall effect is to ensure that, in aggregate, an amount 
corresponding to fair value at the grant date is charged against earnings over the vesting 
period of the instrument.   
The calculations required by international GAAP demand an objective assessment of 
probabilities and value.  Subjective factors that affect the way that the recipient of the share-
based award estimates probabilities or value are not taken into account; yet the results of our 
research have demonstrated that the way senior executives assess valence is affected by risk 
aversion, uncertainty aversion and temporal discounting.  The subjectively perceived value of 
a long-term incentive (i.e., the valence), to a senior executive, is inevitably less than the 
amount which the company providing the incentive has to account for as a cost.  
THE ECONOMIC PSYCHOLOGY OF INCENTIVES 
 
25 
 
Value is created in product markets when the amount a customer is willing to pay for a 
product or service is greater than the cost of providing that product or service, the surplus 
being shared between the supplier (profit) and the buyer (the customer’s surplus).  In a 
similar way, to the extent that a principal remunerates an agent such that the value of an 
award perceived by the agent is greater than the cost to the principal, then value is created 
(i.e., there is an efficiency surplus); conversely, if a principal remunerates an agent in such a 
way that the cost to the principal is greater than the value perceived by the agent, then value 
is destroyed (i.e., there is an inefficiency cost).  Hall and Murphy (2002) argue that long-term 
incentives might still be efficient if the “incentive benefits” of the awards (the retention and 
pay-for-performance effects) exceed the inefficiency costs.  By focusing on valence and 
incorporating agent motivation in our assessment, it is difficult to see in practice how this 
could ever be the case.   
In summary, the evidence obtained from the current research has demonstrated that 
executives will typically perceive the value of long-term incentives to be less than the cost to 
the company, that the destruction of value this entails undermines agent motivation, that this 
in turn affects agent performance, and hence that providing long-term incentives entails a 
significant inefficiency cost for shareholders.  In terms of the research propositions, we 
conclude that the empirical evidence provides support for both Proposition 1 (the valence of 
long-term incentives is systematically under-estimated by senior executives because of the 
way that risk is subjectively assessed and as a result of the cognitive response to uncertainty) 
and Proposition 2 (the valence of long-term incentives is systematically under-estimated by 
senior executives because of the way that time preferences are discounted).  We further 
conclude, notwithstanding measurable differences between countries, that these results are 
not significantly affected by cross-cultural differences, thus supporting Proposition 3.  In 
particular, it should be noted here that the relative degree of risk tolerance found in Mexico 
THE ECONOMIC PSYCHOLOGY OF INCENTIVES 
 
26 
 
and China is offset by conspicuous uncertainty aversion and high temporal discount rates.  
Our results indicate that the behavior of executives in the various countries studied tends to 
follow the general precepts of prospect theory and hyperbolic discounting.  We conclude that 
long-term incentives are not an efficient way of motivating senior executives, irrespective of 
national culture.   
It is also apparent from the generally positive responses in the survey to the questions 
about the motivational impact, attributed value, and perceived effectiveness of long-term 
incentives, underlined by the overall LTI effectiveness index score of .14, that long-term 
incentives are perceived by participants to be effective.  As we have previously stated, 
efficiency is not the same as effectiveness.  Long-term incentives could be effective even if 
they were not efficient.  It is evident, therefore, in the formal language used in the 
introduction, that F∧ ~ E is true in the present case. We are left to consider why this slightly 
surprising result has been obtained: if long-term incentives are as inefficient as our data 
imply, how is it that they are, nevertheless, perceived to be effective in their twin objectives 
of motivating executives and aligning the interests of shareholders with their agents?  Three 
possible answers to this question occur to us: (1) perhaps it is because the recognition which 
follows from being awarded a long-term incentive is more important to executives than the 
value of a long-term incentive; (2) perhaps it is because there are some further psychological 
heuristics and biases which cause executives to value their long-term incentives, taken as a 
whole, more highly then a deconstructed sum-of-the-parts calculation of individual 
components might suggest; or (3) perhaps companies have to increase the size of long-term 
incentive awards in order to compensate for the discounts which executives mentally apply. 
Although the first and second explanations are possible, the inflation in executive pay over 
recent years, combined with the increasing proportion of total compensation represented by 
long-term incentives which was referred to in the introduction, leads us favor the third 
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explanation.  Accordingly, we advance the following conjecture: boards of directors, acting 
on behalf of shareholders, increase the size of long-term incentive awards to executives to 
compensate them for the perceived loss of value when compared with less risky, more certain 
and more immediate forms of reward.  In other words, we argue that part of the explanation 
for the inflation in executive compensation is a consequence of the form in which 
compensation is provided.  This is not the same as the managerial power or “board capture” 
hypothesis (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004; Bebchuk, Fried, & Walker, 2002) which proposes that 
executives exercise undue influence over boards, thereby encouraging non-executive 
directors to allow executive compensation to be inflated over and above the market clearing 
wage.  Our argument is more subtle.  We contend that boards of directors have unwittingly 
been caught in an isomorphic system, recommending the use of inefficient long-term 
incentives in the name of “best practice” and in accordance with the wishes of regulators, yet 
at the same time compensating executives for the perceived loss of value by increasing the 
size of awards, thus contributing to the overall inflation in executive pay.  This is, we 
emphasize, a conjecture, by which we mean a statement which is thought to be true, has face 
validity, is internally consistent, and has not to date been demonstrated to be false (Popper, 
1963).   More evidence is required, but the conjecture is consistent with the phenomenon of 
executive pay inflation during the period that long-term incentives have come to comprise an 
ever greater proportion of total compensation. It is also, as we have already pointed out, 
consistent with the arguments based on rational choice theory and deductive logic advanced 
by Lambert, Larcker and Verrechia (1991), Meulbroek (2001), Hall and Murphy (2002) and 
Buck, Bruce, Main and Udueni (2003). 
 
5.1. Contribution 
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We contribute to the literature on international executive compensation in various ways.  
In particular, by employing a unique set of primary data gathered from executives around the 
world, we demonstrate a number of problems with standard agency theory.   Although our 
propositions are consistent with arguments previously advanced by some rational choice 
theorists (see above), framing these propositions in terms of preferences, perceptions, 
motivation and bounded rationality, and incorporating a reference (in Proposition 2) to time 
discounting, is entirely new.  We also add to the growing literature on the behavioral-agency 
model and put forward further evidence that this provides a better framework for theorizing 
about executive compensation.    
 
5.2. Limitations 
There is a developing literature on methodological issues in international management 
research, notable examples being Schaffer and Riordan (2003) and Cascio (2012).  This has 
identified a number of common problems, including in particular translation (or semantic), 
conceptual and metric (or scale) equivalence.  We have relied heavily on the professional 
expertise of the research firm, which has extensive experience in carrying out multi-language 
global surveys, for the international validity of the research instrument.  The fact that the 
survey participants are international senior executives, a relative sophisticated user group, is 
also helpful in this respect.  Nevertheless, we recognize the residual risk of translation, 
conceptual and metric bias in our results.   
The other limitation of the study relates to the low response rate, already commented on 
above, with the resulting risk of selection bias.  We would argue that this was substantially 
compensated for by assembling a relatively large sample which was representative of the 
relevant population in terms of nationality, job function, age, sex and industry. 
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5.3. Managerial relevance 
The principal application of our research is in rethinking the way that long-term 
incentive plans are designed by revisiting the psychology of incentives.  As a minimum, we 
would recommend that compensation committees should consider how they can best 
communicate the value of long-term incentives to participants: might it be possible to reduce 
the gap between the perceived value and economic value of long-term incentives by 
explaining the benefits more effectively?  More significantly, is it possible to alter certain 
features of long-term incentives in order to increase their perceived value?  For example, 
complex performance criteria appear to increase the level of risk and uncertainty in long-term 
incentives and hence to reduce their perceived value.  Executives might be more effectively 
motivated by receiving smaller awards which do not have complex performance conditions 
attached.  Most radically, might it prove to be both more effective and efficient to arrest the 
trend of placing increasing reliance on high-powered long-term incentives?  Roberts (2010) 
has argued that there are many circumstances when weak incentives may be more efficient 
and effective than strong incentives, including when good measures of an agent’s effort or 
performance are not available, when multi-tasking is required, and when cooperation between 
different agents is necessary. These are, of course, all common situations where top 
management teams are concerned.  We concur with this view.  However, it runs counter to 
the current conventional wisdom about executive compensation which advocates that, 
because of inflation in executive pay, an increased proportion of compensation should be 
deferred and paid via long-term incentives.   
Our argument is that causality may in fact be operating in reverse, that the increase in the 
proportion of pay which is delivered via long-term incentives may actually be contributing to 
inflation in executive compensation, and that a fundamental review of the form in which 
compensation is provided to senior executives is therefore required.   
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Table 1 
Demographics 
 
Variable All participants a Panel 
N = 756 N = 12860 
  
Number % Number % 
Job title: b 
  
Chairman   61   8.0%   396   3.1% 
CEO/President/Managing Director 293 38.8% 1703 13.2% 
CFO/Treasurer/Comptroller   64   8.5%   465   3.6% 
CIO/Technology Director   90 11.9%   404   3.1% 
Other C-level Executive   72   9.5%   663   5.2% 
Senior Vice-President/Vice-President/Director 144 19.0%   690   5.4% 
Head of Business Unit     5   0.7%   915   7.1% 
Head of Department   11   1.5% 1303 10.1% 
Senior Manager     3   0.4% 2824 22.0% 
Other Senior Executive   13   1.7% 3497 27.2% 
     
Age: c 
    
Under 39 194 25.7% 3761 29.2% 
40-44 142 18.8% 2550 19.8% 
45-49 143 18.9% 2296 17.9% 
50-54 115 15.2% 1783 13.9% 
55-59   80 10.6% 1301 10.1% 
60-64   51   6.7%   770   6.0% 
65 +   31   4.1%   399   3.1% 
     
Gender: d 
    
Male 619 81.9% 9824 76.4% 
Female 137 18.1% 3036 23.6% 
     
Industry sector: e 
  
 
 
Aerospace 12 1.6%   142   1.1% 
Defense   6 0.8%     92   0.7% 
Asset Management   9 1.2%   189   1.5% 
Automotive 14 1.9%   337   2.6% 
Banking and Capital Markets 38 5.0%   586   4.6% 
Business services 55 7.4% 1053   8.2% 
Capital Projects and Infrastructure 17 2.2%   178   1.4% 
Chemicals 20 2.6%   263   2.0% 
Communications 18 2.4%   426   3.3% 
Energy, Utilities and Mining 23 3.0%   361   2.8% 
Engineering and Construction 53 7.0%   950   7.4% 
Entertainment and Media 22 2.9%   399   3.1% 
Financial Services 37 4.9%   586   4.6% 
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Forestry, Paper and Packaging 12 1.6%   101   0.8% 
Government and Public Services 10 1.3%   414   3.2% 
Healthcare 34 4.5%   547   4.3% 
Hospitality and Leisure 22 2.9%   450   3.5% 
Industrial Manufacturing 54 7.2%   888   6.9% 
Insurance 23 3.0%   331   2.6% 
Metals 14 1.9%   183   1.4% 
Oil and Gas 17 2.2%   281   2.2% 
Pharmaceuticals and Life Sciences 15 2.0%   308   2.4% 
Retail and Consumer 60 7.9% 1024   8.0% 
Technology 69 9.1%   840   6.5% 
Transport and Logistics 26 3.4%   411   3.2% 
Other 76 10.1% 1520   11.7% 
     
Country: f 
    
United States 123 16.3% 1417 11.0% 
United Kingdom   34 4.5%   826 6.4% 
France   35 4.6%   976 7.6% 
Netherlands   55 7.3%   255 2.0% 
Switzerland   40 5.3%   325 2.5% 
Germany   31 4.1%   340 2.6% 
Spain   30 4.0%   270 2.1% 
Russia   45 6.0%   380 3.0% 
Poland   30 4.0%   275 2.1% 
Brazil   52 6.9%   395 3.1% 
Mexico   28 3.7%   536 4.2% 
Argentina   14 1.9%   170 1.3% 
China   51 6.7% 1602 12.5% 
India   31 4.1% 1161 9.0% 
Australia   31 4.1%   626 4.9% 
Middle East   75 9.9%   431 3.3% 
South Africa   31 4.1%   410 3.2% 
Other    20 2.6% 2463 19.2% 
a Goodness of fit with the demographics of the underlying panel was tested using a χ2 test, the overall result being χ2 (62 
df, N =756) = 2.57, p < 0.005, indicating a significant degree of fit.  Goodness of fit at individual factor level are shown 
in the following notes b to f.  b χ2 (9 df, N =756) = 1.85, p < .001;  c χ2 (6 df, N =756.) = .011, p < .005; d χ2 (1 df, N =756) = 
.017, p < .25; e χ2 (25 df, N =756.) = .055; p < .005; f χ2 (17 df, N =756) =.637, p < .005
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Table 2 
Aggregate results 
 
Question All participants 
N = 756 
Participants with LTIs 
n = 365 
 A B C A B C 
Risk       
1 (A) Gamble  $5,250 (p=0.50); (B) $2,250 (p=1.00); (C) Indifferent 
between A and B 
284 363 109 145 170 50 
37.6% 48.0% 14.4% 39.7% 46.6% 13.7% 
2 (A) Bonus $90,000 (p=0.50); (B) $41,250 (p=1.00); (C) Indifferent 
between A and B 
222 473 61 103 231 31 
29.4% 62.6% 8.1% 28.2% 63.3% 8.5% 
Cronbach’s α 
Inter-item correlation 
                       .671 
.512** 
                      .653 
.492** 
Risk aversion index  -.24   -.23  
Uncertainty       
1 (A) Winning $5,250 (p=0.50); (B) Winning $5,250 (0.25 ≤ p ≤ 0.75); 
(C) Indifferent between A and B 
355 268 133 162 144 59 
47.0% 35.4% 17.6% 44.4% 39.5% 16.2% 
2 (A) Bonus $45,000 in three years (p=1.00) (B) Bonus of 10,000 × P 
shares in three years ($2.25 ≤  P ≤ $6.75); (C) Indifferent between A 
and B 
352 340 64 169 162 34 
46.6% 45.0% 8.5% 46.3% 44.4% 9.3% 
3 (A) Bonus of $52,500 in three years if EPS growth is > RPI + 3%; (B) 
Bonus of 11,650 shares subject to relative TSR performance;   (C) 
Indifferent between A and B. 
382 284 90 174 158 33 
50.5% 37.6% 11.9% 47.7% 43.3% 9.0% 
Cronbach’s α 
Inter-item correlation 
.577 
.271**  .278**  .406** 
.626 
.303** .340** .444** 
Uncertainty aversion index  -.10   -.04  
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Time       
1 (A) Winning $2,250 tomorrow (p=0.75); (B) Winning $5,250 in three 
years (p=0.75); (C) Indifferent between  A and B 
387 265 104 182 140 43 
51.2% 35.1% 13.8% 49.9% 38.4% 11.8% 
2 (A) Bonus $37,500 tomorrow (p=0.75); (B) Bonus $90,000 in three 
years (p=0.75); (C) Indifferent between A and B 
329 337 90 158 169 38 
43.5% 44.6% 11.9% 43.3% 46.3% 10.4% 
3 (A) Bonus $56,250 tomorrow (p=0.75); (B) Bonus $90,000 in three 
years (p=0.75); (C) Indifferent between A and B 
398 272 86 196 132 37 
52.6% 36.0% 11.4% 53.7% 36.2% 10.1% 
Cronbach’s α 
Inter-item correlation 
 .783* 
.549** .474**.622** 
.755* 
.495**.432**.598** 
Estimated median time discount rate  33%   32%  
LTI effectiveness     
1. “I am strongly motivated to participate in my firm’s LTIP”:       
(A) Yes; (B) Neutral; (C) No 
226 77 62 226 77 62 
61.9% 21.1% 17.0% 61.9% 21.1% 17.0% 
2. “I value the opportunity to participate in my firm’s LTIP”:         
(A) Yes; (B) Neutral; (C) No 
229 66 70 229 66 70 
62.7% 18.1% 19.2% 62.7% 18.1% 19.2% 
3. “My firm’s LTIPS in an effective incentive”:                              (A) 
Yes; (B) Neutral; (C) No 
191 100 74 191 100 74 
52.3% 27.4% 20.3% 52.3% 27.4% 20.3% 
 Cronbach’s α 
Inter-item correlation 
    .872 * 
.738**.648**.696** 
.872* 
.738**.648**.696** 
 LTI effectiveness index  .14   .14  
Reliability was assessed for pairs of questions by calculating inter-item correlations and for triplets using Cronbach’s α.  Optimal inter-item 
correlations are in the range .2 to .5 and the Cronbach’s α scale should be above .7.  In the case of the three questions on uncertainty Cronbach’s α 
was between .5 and .7, but this was compensated for by satisfactory inter-item correlations.   * α > .7 is acceptable (Pallant, 2007)  ** Inter-item 
correlation is significant, p<.01, n = 365 
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Table 3 
Country indices 
 
Country N = 756 Inflation 
ratea  
Risk 
aversion            
index 
Uncertainty 
aversion 
index 
Time 
discount 
rateb 
LTI 
effectiveness 
index 
Argentina 
  14 9.5% -.08  .08 31.2%   .07 
Australia 
  31 3.4% -.54  .03 44.4%   .28 
Brazil 
  52 6.6% -.12 -.07 43.0%   .12 
China 
  51 5.4%  .08 -.04 30.5%   .16 
France 
  35 2.1%  .01  .00 24.4%   .19 
Germany 
  31 2.3% -.38 -.07 14.6%   .26 
India 
  31 8.9% -.17  -.08 17.2%   .10 
Mexico 
  28 3.4%  .32 -.16 69.7%   .04 
Netherlands 
  55 2.4% -.25 -.19 15.3%   .06 
Poland 
  30 4.2% -.24 -.12 48.2% -.06 
Russia 
  45 8.4% -.38 -.09 34.0%   .04 
 South Africa 
  31 5.0% -.30 -.09 52.1%   .15 
Spain 
  30 3.2% -.25 -.09 18.2%   .19 
Switzerland 
  40 0.2% -.29 -.17 15.0%   .12 
United Arab Emirates 
  75 0.9% -.38 -.12 39.4%   .13 
United Kingdom 
  34 4.5% -.62 -.19 27.4%   .26 
United States 123 3.2% -.34 -.10 30.8%   .17 
Other    20 4.9% -.21 -.90 49.0%   .27 
 
      
Mean 
 
-.23 -.08 33.0%   .13 
Median  -.24 -.09 31.0%   .13 
Standard deviation    .23  .07 15.0%   .09 
95% confidence limit:      
   Lower bound  -.35 -.12 24.6%   .09 
   Upper bound  -.11 -.05 40.5%   .18 
Skewness   .70  .64    .83  -.22 
Kurtosis       1.04  .35    .54   .05 
Shapiro-Wilk test   p = .96  p = .94  p =  .92  p =  .97 
 
a  Source: World Bank, index of consumer price inflation, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG, 
downloaded 2nd April 2013.   
b There was no significant correlation between time discount rates and the inflation:  r = .096, n = 17 
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Table 4 
Hofstedea correlations 
 
 
PDI IDV MAS UAI LTO 
Risk index .520    -.642** .009 .267  .004 
Uncertainty index .067 -.123 .049 .193 -.198 
Time discount rate .369 -.290 .408 .242 -.596* 
 
a The five Hofstede dimensions are abbreviated as follows: PDI = power distance, IDV = individualism vs. 
collectivism, MAS = masculinity vs. femininity, UAI = uncertainty avoidance, and LTO = long-term 
orientation. 
* Correlation is significant p<.05, n = 17.  ** Correlation is significant p<.01, n = 17 
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Notes 
1.    Based on data provided by The Conference Board (“The US Top Executive Compensation Report” 2006 and 
2011) and Income Data Services (“Directors’ Pay Report” 2006 and 2011). 
2. It should be noted that Barnard used the term efficiency in a different way to that used here.  To Barnard an 
organization was “efficient” if it satisfied the motives of its members. 
3. http://www.geerthofstede.com/dimension-data-matrix  (downloaded 3rd April 2013) 
